Everyone’s going MOOC-crazy these days. From frequent media coverage of online courses and platforms like Coursera, edX, Udacity, and Udemy to discussions about the complexities and business models of online education, the excitement around MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) has finally “bubbled” over.

在最近的這些日子里,MOOC 讓每個人為之瘋狂。在媒體對在線課程及諸如 Coursera, edX, Udacity, Udemy 這些平臺的大規(guī)模報(bào)道,以及關(guān)于其復(fù)雜性和商業(yè)模式的各種討論之后,圍繞 MOOC 的各種興奮終于歸于平靜。

The question is not just whether MOOCs are going to disrupt traditional education, but how. Is it just about lower costs and access? Is it really going to be a Napster-like moment with entrenched “Teamsters in tweed” worried about the erosion of their research, publishing, and teaching?

但當(dāng)前的問題已不是 MOOC 是否會顛覆傳統(tǒng)教育,而是會如何顛覆傳統(tǒng)教育。難道 MOOC 的優(yōu)勢僅在于更低的成本和更便捷的學(xué)習(xí)渠道?MOOC 真會如某些老頑固所言,侵蝕他們的研究、出版和教學(xué)活動,造就諸如當(dāng)年Napster顛覆音樂行業(yè)的時刻?

This is where we can leave the realm of hype and commentary to draw on our own years of research into disruption theory. Because the curious thing about the MOOC wave of disruption is that the market leaders — not just upstarts from the edges — are the ones pioneering it. And that rarely happens.

在關(guān)于 MOOC 的各種炒作和評論之外,我們得以分享我們自己就顛覆性創(chuàng)新的多年研究。因?yàn)?,這一波由 MOOC 掀起的顛覆式浪潮中有一點(diǎn)足讓人好奇,即那些處于市場中心的既得利益者,而不僅僅是那些處于市場邊緣的創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì),在率先引導(dǎo)(制造)這樣一個變革, 而這種情況,此前很少發(fā)生。

But First: Are MOOCs Really ‘Disruptive’?

Yes, the word “disrupt” is overused. But it has a specific meaning when we’re talking about it. And MOOCs do bear the early hallmarks of a disruptive innovation:

首先,MOOC果真在“顛覆”嗎?

沒錯,“顛覆”這個詞已經(jīng)被用爛了。不過,這個被用爛的詞背后實(shí)際有其指代,我們說 MOOC 是顛覆式的,也確實(shí)名正言順,原因有三:

Serves non-consumers. MOOCs are limited in the services they provide compared to traditional colleges, yet at the same time they are free and more accessible — which allows them to serve those who couldn’t otherwise access traditional higher education. Similarly, Toyota’s early cars didn’t match the reliability of Detroit’s automobiles. But they were more affordable and convenient, so the company first served people (“non-consumers”) for whom the alternative was, quite literally, nothing.

1.非目標(biāo)客戶終于被包括進(jìn)來:跟傳統(tǒng)高校的服務(wù)相比,MOOC 確有很多不足之處。但與此同時,MOOC 的各類課程卻是免費(fèi)的,而且也更容易獲取——這就使得它們可以輻射到那些原本無福消受高等教育的一大群用戶。舉個類似的例子,豐田早期的汽車就沒有底特律各大公司產(chǎn)的可靠性那么強(qiáng),但因?yàn)樨S田的車子更便宜也更方便,所以這家公司第一次讓那些非目標(biāo)客戶變成了目標(biāo)客戶——對這部分用戶來說,幾乎不存在其他公司提供的可行方案。

Marches upmarket. Instead of serving the same customers at the outset or competing head-on with established products, disruptive innovations improve over time to march upmarket. Eventually the quality becomes just good enough for the established customers to flock to it. It’s worth noting that the upmarket march is enabled by some key technology — such as bandwidth, video quality, online sharing tools, etc. — which is why MOOCs may now be having their moment, even though they’ve been around for years.

2.逐漸向中高端市場挺進(jìn):顛覆性創(chuàng)新往往不是一開始上來就跟既得利益者搶客戶、與其正面較量,而是隨著時間的推進(jìn)不斷優(yōu)化,逐漸挺進(jìn)中高端市場。但最終,顛覆性產(chǎn)品的性能會達(dá)到足夠好,讓市場中既有的客戶乖乖奔向他們。不過需要注意的一點(diǎn)是,實(shí)現(xiàn)上述這種情況往往有賴于某些核心技術(shù)的成熟——比如說帶寬、視頻質(zhì)量、在線分享工具的保障等——這些都是 MOOC 現(xiàn)在崛起的原因,盡管它們已經(jīng)存在了數(shù)年。

Redefines quality. Eventually, the disruptive innovation changes the very definition of quality in a marketplace. In the current university system, for example, most faculty are rewarded for the quality of their research — not for the quality of their teaching. But the medium and scale changes things; in the future, courses might be offered based on employer demand, not faculty research interests. MOOCs are already evolving in some ways away from traditional educational constraints: Udacity’s courses, for example, have shifted from a time-controlled to a more competency-based learning model that takes advantage of the online medium.

3.重新定義什么叫好:最終,顛覆性創(chuàng)新會改變整個市場對于“品質(zhì)”的定義。在現(xiàn)有的大學(xué)體系下,舉個例子,大部分教師的評級標(biāo)準(zhǔn)都是基于他們的學(xué)術(shù)研究質(zhì)量——而非他們的教學(xué)質(zhì)量。但是,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)媒介和規(guī)?;瘜㈤_啟新的變革。在未來,提供哪些課程將取決于雇主(這里指付費(fèi)的學(xué)生),而非教師的研究興趣。目前,MOOC 已經(jīng)在幾個方向上擺脫傳統(tǒng)教育束縛逐漸演變:舉個例子,Udacity 的課程就開始發(fā)揮在線媒介的優(yōu)勢,從一個基于時間控制的學(xué)習(xí)模式轉(zhuǎn)向一個基于個人能力的學(xué)習(xí)模式(按學(xué)生的掌握情況而非簡單地依照學(xué)時推進(jìn)課程)。

Does Who Is Doing the Disrupting Matter?

Given the above criteria, it’s unusual, and remarkably difficult, for established market leaders to pioneer — or even catch up — with disruptions.

到底誰在牽頭搞顛覆,這事重要嗎?

基于上述的三個標(biāo)準(zhǔn),讓市場中固有的既得利益者做變革的先驅(qū)者,甚至說是趕上顛覆的節(jié)奏,這種情況不但不常見,而且困難重重。

Yet interestingly, the big, reputable universities are the ones leading the MOOC wave. This includes MIT and Harvard (through edX) as well as Stanford, whose groundbreaking AI course morphed into Udacity (and whose professors independently founded Coursera).

但很有意思的一點(diǎn)是,現(xiàn)在恰是那些牛哄哄的大學(xué)在引領(lǐng)這樣一波變革浪潮,這其中就包括 MIT 和哈佛(通過 edX 的項(xiàng)目),以及斯坦福,后者的突破性人工智能課程逐漸演變成了今時的 Udacity,而斯坦福的教授也自立門戶,創(chuàng)建了 Coursera。

It’s not that established players can’t see the disruptions coming; they almost always do. There are just several other forces at play that cause market leaders to ignore them. For example, disruptive innovations don’t look that attractive, profitable, or prestigious early on. Or the company’s best customers signal that they don’t care for them (at least initially). But universities are likely investing in MOOCs now because disruption theory is finally widely enough understood that astute leaders know how to identify and chase opportunities early.

大伙兒可能存在一個普遍誤解,即認(rèn)為那些記得利益者無法預(yù)見顛覆的到來,但事實(shí)上,他們幾乎每次都可以,只是,存在其他的幾個因素使得已有的市場領(lǐng)跑者對其疏落。舉個例子,顛覆性創(chuàng)新在早期看起來往往不那么誘人、有利可圖、或享有很高的聲望;也可能,該家公司中最有價(jià)值的那部分客戶表示對它不感興趣(起碼是在一開始)。但是,現(xiàn)在各個高校傾向于投資 MOOC,則是因?yàn)闅v史的一次次重演終于讓“顛覆性”理論廣為人知,而那些精明的領(lǐng)先者也知道如何在早期就去判斷、爭取各種機(jī)會。

When established players want to (successfully) catch a disruptive wave, however, they have to set up an autonomous business model with different resources, processes, and priorities. Otherwise, the very capabilities that serve them well in their traditional business can represent liabilities in the one they’re disrupting. This is how IBM was able to go from the mainframe to personal computing business in the ’80s and ’90s, and it’s why MOOCs have done well in spinning themselves off into separate entities.

不過,假如既得利益者想要成功地抓住一次顛覆性浪潮中的機(jī)會,那么他們必須單獨(dú)開辟與他們既有業(yè)務(wù)不同的,在資源、流程、優(yōu)先級等方面都獨(dú)立的商業(yè)模式——否則,讓他們在傳統(tǒng)業(yè)務(wù)中吃香喝辣的各種流程很有可能會成為新型的顛覆性業(yè)務(wù)中的拖油瓶。IBM 就是依靠這么一個獨(dú)立戰(zhàn)略,成功在上世紀(jì)八九十年代從大型機(jī)轉(zhuǎn)型 PC 業(yè)務(wù),這也是為什么 MOOC 可以從母體(高等院校)脫離成為獨(dú)立實(shí)體的原因。

Although the big three MOOCs — Coursera, edX, and Udacity — all leverage capabilities from their “parent” universities, they still have to be careful about which ones to adopt and which ones to avoid. Ideally, they should be able to pull what they want instead of having their university parents push resources (like administrative processes) to them.

盡管目前 MOOC 的三座大山 Coursera, edX, and Udacity 全部都利用了母體的資源,但它們?nèi)孕枰?jǐn)慎處理,到底哪些模式是可以吸收的,哪些是需要回避的。在理想情況下,它們應(yīng)該要掌握自主權(quán),從母體中抽取它們想要的那部分資源,而非由母體強(qiáng)制輸送(比如各種陳舊的行政制度)。

The only place the direction of this relationship doesn’t matter, according to our research, is brand. Being associated with the likes of Harvard, MIT, and Stanford doesn’t hurt, especially when it comes to signaling quality (i.e., “endorser” brands), as long as the disruptor can signal some separation for a job well done (i.e., “purpose” brands) in the new disruptive realm — hence the power of the “X” in edX. Leveraging its brand helped IBM move through multiple disruptive waves.

基于我們的研究,在 MOOC 嘗試對自己跟母體的關(guān)系趨利避害時,唯一無須顧忌的一個方向是“品牌”。公眾將某個 MOOC 平臺與哈佛、MIT 和斯坦福這樣的高校聯(lián)系在一起,對這些平臺并無傷害,尤其是談到教學(xué)品質(zhì)時(即所謂的背書人品牌),只要顛覆者可以說明,在新的顛覆領(lǐng)域,他們所做的事與既有模式不同即可(即所謂的目標(biāo)品牌) ——而這也就是 edX 中“X”這個字母背后的力量(x 是數(shù)學(xué)中的一個變量,代表參與高校的數(shù)量,edX 背后影射的是一流高校聯(lián)盟,即說明高校品牌的巨大影響力)。IBM 就是巧用了自身品牌的力量,成功突破幾次顛覆性浪潮。

So What Comes Next for the MOOCs?

MOOCs can be much more than marketing and edutainment. We believe they are likely to evolve into a “scale business”: one that relies on the technology and data backbone of the medium to optimize and individualize learning opportunities for millions of students.

所以,MOOC將走向何方?

MOOC 可不僅僅是營銷和寓教于樂。我們認(rèn)為,它們很有可能會演變成“規(guī)?;臉I(yè)務(wù)”,這一業(yè)務(wù)會依賴互聯(lián)網(wǎng)媒介的技術(shù)和數(shù)據(jù),讓成千上萬學(xué)生的學(xué)習(xí)機(jī)會得以實(shí)現(xiàn)最優(yōu)化、個性化。

This is very different than simply putting a video of a professor lecturing online.

The initial MOOCs came from a “process business model” where companies bring inputs together at one end and transform them into a higher-value output for customers at the other end — as with the retail and manufacturing industries.

這跟簡單將教授的一個講座視頻放到網(wǎng)上完全是兩碼事。

最初的 MOOC 還依賴于一個“流程型的商業(yè)模式”,即教育公司將所有內(nèi)容輸入聚于一端,然后將這些內(nèi)容轉(zhuǎn)化成價(jià)值更高的輸出提供給另一端的客戶——這跟零售和制造業(yè)是一樣的。

But over time, an approach where users exchange information from each other similar to Facebook or telecommunications (a “facilitated network model”) will come to dominate online learning. This evolution is especially likely to happen if the traditional degree becomes irrelevant and, as many predict, learning becomes a continuous, on-the-job learning process. Then the need for customization will drive us toward just-in-time mini-courses.

但隨著時間的推移,用戶間自主交換信息的模式,諸如用戶間在 Facebook 上互動,或遠(yuǎn)程通訊互動一樣(類似開放平臺的概念),將會逐漸統(tǒng)治在線教育。這種演變很有可能會發(fā)生——假如,正如很多人預(yù)言的那樣,傳統(tǒng)的學(xué)位制度退居二位,個體的學(xué)習(xí)變成一個連續(xù)性的、終身式的過程。那么,對個性化的需求將驅(qū)動我們選擇那些基于 JIT 準(zhǔn)時制(豐田在 20 世紀(jì) 60 年代實(shí)行的一種生產(chǎn)方式,可理解為在需要的時候,按需要的量生產(chǎn)所需的產(chǎn)品)的迷你課程。

In this case, facilitated networks or adaptive learning platforms — like Khan Academy and Knewton — may actually be better positioned than MOOCs (in their current forms) to improve learning and serve massive numbers of students with tailored offerings. Such a transformation is not unlike what happened in the car industry: The Ford Model T dominated the American car market … until General Motors brought forth choice and variety.

在這種情況下,促進(jìn)式網(wǎng)絡(luò)(facilitated networks)或那些自適應(yīng)的學(xué)習(xí)平臺——比如像可汗學(xué)院和Knewton這樣的,通過為學(xué)生量身定制的產(chǎn)品,就可能比 MOOC(就他們現(xiàn)有的模式而言)更好地服務(wù)于學(xué)生、促進(jìn)學(xué)習(xí)。這種轉(zhuǎn)變跟汽車行業(yè)業(yè)已發(fā)生的變革類似:先前,福特的 Model T 一直統(tǒng)治著美國的汽車市場,直到通用帶來了第四代的、更多樣化的選擇。